The war between Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran last month did not produce any sign of regime change in Iran. Israel, of course, made it explicitly clear from the outset that its objective was not regime change in Iran, but that its actions could inadvertently create the conditions for the Iranian people to achieve this. And as Israel gained control of Iran’s skies and successfully started to eliminate much of the Islamic Republic’s senior military leadership and infrastructure, the belief that this could catalyze anti-regime protests gained momentum—not least among the Iranian opposition abroad.
Now, however, as the dust from the conflict settles, policymakers, military officials, and many Iranian dissidents and opposition groups are questioning why the Iranian people did not seize this supposedly unique moment to stage an uprising. The Islamic Republic’s propaganda apparatus has, of course, capitalized on the absence of unrest, claiming that the reason Iranians did not take to the streets is because they are, in fact, supportive of the regime.
The war between Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran last month did not produce any sign of regime change in Iran. Israel, of course, made it explicitly clear from the outset that its objective was not regime change in Iran, but that its actions could inadvertently create the conditions for the Iranian people to achieve this. And as Israel gained control of Iran’s skies and successfully started to eliminate much of the Islamic Republic’s senior military leadership and infrastructure, the belief that this could catalyze anti-regime protests gained momentum—not least among the Iranian opposition abroad.
Now, however, as the dust from the conflict settles, policymakers, military officials, and many Iranian dissidents and opposition groups are questioning why the Iranian people did not seize this supposedly unique moment to stage an uprising. The Islamic Republic’s propaganda apparatus has, of course, capitalized on the absence of unrest, claiming that the reason Iranians did not take to the streets is because they are, in fact, supportive of the regime.
But this is far from the truth. The real reason relates to the largely unknown security measures that the regime preemptively activated the moment that Israel’s operations started. Since 2007, the regime has invested in creating an extensive suppressive apparatus across Iran, at every level of society—something that both foreign powers and the Iranian opposition have completely overlooked.
While there is intelligence and analysis on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Intelligence Organization and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MONTH), the most important operational organ in terms of implementing security measures across the Iranian streets during times of unrest has been completely overlooked: the IRGC’s operational security-military headquarters. And since 2007, these headquarters have established a comprehensive apparatus that cuts across every Iranian province, city, municipality, district, and even neighborhood.
Working under the IRGC’s Ground Forces—one of the organization’s main branches—there are 11 operational security-military headquarters across Iran. These headquarters are responsible for maintaining the regime’s security and political order in Iran’s 31 provinces.
Each of these 11 headquarters usually has about three Iranian provinces under its purview and control. Each province also has its own IRGC provincial guard operating under the command of the relevant security-military headquarters.
In 2007, the then-IRGC commander in chief, Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari—now the head of the shadowy IRGC cultural and social headquarters—established the provincial guards to better streamline coordination between military and security units in every Iranian province. This was deemed necessary after the lessons that the IRGC learned from the 2003 U.S. war in Iraq and the fast collapse of Saddam Hussein. The concept was based on the view that each province should have the means to protect itself during times of crisis when the main chain of command with Tehran is interrupted. These provincial guards function like military chiefs for their respective provinces, overseeing all IRGC and Basij offices and bases throughout the area. Each provincial guard commands two operational wings: an infantry unit and a security unit.
The former is designed to protect the province from foreign attacks, whereas the latter is trained to neutralize domestic threats in the form of protests and uprisings. However, during times of domestic crises such as expansive unrest, the infantry units are incorporated into the security apparatus, as was the case during the anti-regime protests in Iran in both 2019 and 2022.
But the security layers of the IRGC’s operational security-military headquarters do not simply stop at the provincial level. They cover every geographical layer within each Iranian province: from cities and towns to municipal districts and even every neighborhood, in which there are units comprising both men and women. (Gender-specific units became especially important as women have become more involved in spearheading anti-regime protests.)
This entire suppressive ecosystem was preemptively and entirely operationalized as Israel’s military operations in Iran began in mid-June. As Israel took control of Iranian airspace, the Iranian Interior Ministry’s National Security Council (known as “SHAK”) gave orders to the IRGC operational-security military headquarters to neutralize any gathering that could lead to protests.
Following SHAK’s orders, the 11 IRGC operational security-military headquarters and the IRGC provincial guards activated all the layers of security under their command structure across Iran, especially in big cities such as Tehran.
This resulted in the immediate installation of security checkpoints at each municipality’s regional zones, districts, and neighborhoods—including in rural areas— across all Iranian provinces, including the cities of Tehran, Shiraz, and Esfahan. These checkpoints were designed to enable stop-and-search operations against Iranian pedestrians and vehicles. Such measures involved the confiscation of civilian phones without warrants to search for any anti-regime or pro-Israel content, including any material mocking the Islamic Republic. Vehicles were also searched for “sensitive” dual-use items that could undermine the security apparatus, such as drones and communication equipment.
In addition to such measures, roadblocks manned by Basij units armed with batons were deployed across all main highways and squares throughout the municipality regions and districts by the IRGC-Basij Regional Office and Basij district offices. Armed Basij patrols were also operationalized across all main roads and intersections. Likewise, as reports began to circulate of Iranians taking to their rooftops to chant anti-regime slogans—such as “death to the dictator”—the neighborhood offices deployed their male and female groups to carry out street patrols across different neighborhoods to identify the apartment blocks carrying out such activity.
Beyond physical operations, the 11 IRGC operational security-military headquarters also took extensive measures targeting the Iranian people’s ability to communicate. As Israeli strikes began, the Iran’s national-security bodies gave orders to first reduce of the internet significantly and then later imposed a complete blackout for more than three days. (Internet speed in the country remains significantly reduced and restricted, even though the conflict has ended.)
In adopting such preemptive actions, the goals of the IRGC’s operational security-military headquarters were threefold. First, to evoke fear and intimidation through creating a deeply securitized environment and atmosphere. Second, to demonstrate to the population that the regime still maintains the streets and is in control of the political order.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the preemptive development of this extensive security web is geared toward preventing and neutralizing the initial nucleus (hasteh-e avaliyeh in Farsi) of any potential gathering that could spiral out of control and catalyze uncontrollable protests.
These measures paid dividends for the Islamic Republic. In just 12 days, almost 1000 civilians were arbitrarily detained under the vague notion of “supporting” Israel. This includes those who were stopped-and-searched at checkpoints and found to have content on their cellphones that was deemed to be “supporting Israeli attacks” or mocking the Islamic Republic. The regime has even already executed an unclear number of existing detainees on trumped up charges.
Perhaps more importantly, the highly securitized and intrusive environment that these measures were able to foster, coupled with Israel’s strikes, resulted in Iranians either staying indoors or emptying the main cities instead of taking to the streets.
It was not until the final few days of the war that Israel turned its attention to targeting the IRGC’s operational security-military headquarters and provincial forces. For example, the Karbala headquarters—which controls the security of Khuzestan, Kohgiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad, and Lorestan—was struck. Likewise, the Provincial Guard for Alborz province, the IRGC Imam Hassan Mojtaba Corps, was also targeted.
However, whereas Israel’s strikes effectively dismantled much of the IRGC’s military and nuclear infrastructure, they only touched the tip of the iceberg in relation to its extensive suppressive apparatus. The main artery preserving the regime’s domestic security was left relatively unscathed. In other words, despite Israel controlling the skies, the regime’s security forces still dominated the streets, leaving no space for the Iranian people to protest.
Unless the IRGC’s extensive security web—which permeates every level of Iranian society and provincial structure—is dismantled or at least significantly weakened, large-scale anti-regime protests are unlikely to take root, despite widespread public discontent. This apparatus has been the most significant barrier to change in Iran over the past 46 years.
