Welcome back to Foreign Policy’s Latin America Brief, and Happy New Year.
This week, we’re previewing some of the biggest stories of 2026: the future of U.S.-Mexico-Canada relations amid a trade deal review and the World Cup, the race for the next United Nations secretary-generaland key elections across the region.
In recent decades, the politics and economies of Canada, Mexico, and the United States have become so intertwined that leaders’ summits between the countries earned the nickname the Three Amigos.
U.S. President Donald Trump tested the limits of that friendship last year via tariffs, threats to abandon a trilateral trade deal, and harsh immigration restrictions that could undermine the success of the 2026 FIFA World Cup, which will be held across the three countries.
This summer, the countries will face a deadline for whether to scrap, keep, or tweak the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) trade deal that took effect in 2020—just as the soccer tournament gets underway. The fate of both will affect the all-important North American relationship.
USMCA was negotiated during Trump’s first term, replacing the North American Free Trade Agreement. It has a built-in review process that is due to conclude by July 1. Mexico and Canada would like to see the deal extended in something close to its current form, while Trump’s trade representative, Jamieson Greer, recently said that the United States had considered exiting the deal and replacing it with separate bilateral agreements.
In private, U.S. negotiators appear committed to the deal, senior Canadian officials have said. But Trump’s unpredictability, especially on trade, means that the fate of the deal is an open question. U.S. tariffs on Canada and Mexico last year already slowed growth in both countries; some experts say the levies violated the USMCA.
The outcome of the USMCA review could provide clarity on where U.S. tariff levels will ultimately settle. For Mexico and Canada, a sharp departure from current USMCA rules would force an initially painful reorganization of their foreign trade relations. Some 75 percent of Canada’s exports and 80 percent of Mexico’s currently go to the United States.
The World Cup, for its part, could affect public opinion of the United States in Mexico and the broader region. Hosting the tournament is an opportunity for any country to boost its soft power. But this year’s edition is already marred by worries about how the Trump administration’s anti-migrant stance could affect some fans, especially those from Latin America and the Caribbean.
The United States hosted an international tournament of soccer clubs last year. During that event, U.S. authorities detained an asylum-seeker living in the United States who was on the way to a game and later deported him. (He was initially detained for unauthorized use of a drone.) The White House envoy for the World Cup said last month that Trump would not rule out immigration raids at this year’s tournament.
Such raids could affect people from Latin America and the Caribbean who are currently in the United States, and some of those living outside the country might be blocked from attending the tournament altogether because of Trump’s travel bans.
That is the case for Haitian soccer fans, even as Haiti has qualified for the World Cup for the first time in 50 years. Trump banned Haitians from entering the United States in June. As of December, the White House had issued an exemption for soccer players, but not fans.
By last June, public opinion of the United States in Brazil and Mexico had turned more negative under Trump, according to a Pew survey. A World Cup characterized by deportations and blocked fans could accelerate the trend.
If Mexico provides an especially positive experience for tourists, that could hasten a different pattern. The number of visitors to the country was on track to break a record in 2025, according to government data through October. While U.S. tourism is growing dimmerthat of neighboring Mexico is shining brighter.
Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva gestures during the opening ceremony of the Brazil-Paraguay Integration Bridge in Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil, on Dec. 19, 2025.Evaristo Sa/AFP via Getty Images
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Haiti, and Peru will all hold presidential elections this year, and the contests in the first two countries will have implications well beyond their borders.
Because of term limits, Colombia will bid farewell to leftist President Gustavo Petro, who sought—with mixed success—to depart from the hard-line war on drugs, to increase Bogotá’s foreign-policy independence from Washington, and to spur a global coalition of countries to move away from dependence on oil and gas.
Petro’s approval rating sits at around 40 percent or lower, which bodes poorly for his ally and potential successorIván Cepeda. With a more conservative president, Colombia’s energy and security policies could take a sharp turn, and it could join the region’s column of pro-Trump countries.
A loss for Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who is seeking a fourth term in office, could have a similar result. A rightward shift in Brazil would be consequential for the region. It could lead the country to scale down its ambitions to shape the agenda of global south countries, a hallmark of Lula’s administration. It might also slow Brazil’s work on road, rail, and port infrastructure projects to better physically integrate South American economies.
Bolivian President Rodrigo Paz, who took office in November, aims to open the country’s lithium reserves to more private investment. Meanwhile, Brazil’s legislature is debating a draft critical minerals policy that would channel some of the country’s raw materials into local processing plants.
China is pitching itself as a partner for Latin American governments to boost their domestic industries related to critical minerals. The Trump administration has brought up critical minerals in its talks with multiple Latin American governments and pledged to cooperate on critical minerals investments with Argentina. The European Union has also touted the matter as a potential area of cooperation.
Whether Latin American countries can use their critical minerals as a springboard to industrial growth and locally made technologies is a question that will define the century, not just this year. But it’s clear that if Latin American countries do not set their own critical minerals policies, superpowers may be interested in setting the rules of engagement for them.
Samuel Moncada, Venezuela’s ambassador to the United Nations, speaks during a U.N. Security Council meeting on U.S. military actions against Venezuela, at U.N. headquarters in New York on Dec. 23, 2025. Angela Weiss/AFP via Getty Images
The United Nations will choose its next secretary-general this year, and an informal custom stipulates that it is Latin America and the Caribbean’s turn to field the leader. In recent months, calls have also grown for the U.N. to name its first female secretary-general. Lula is among those who came out in favor of electing a woman to the position last year.
Chile’s outgoing administration nominated former Chilean President Michelle Bachelet for the position, though President-elect José Antonio Kast has not said whether he will maintain the nomination. Costa Rica nominated former Vice President Rebeca Grynspan. Both have senior U.N. leadership experience.
Mexican Natural Resources Secretary Alicia Bárcena and Barbados Prime Minister Mia Mottley are also being informally eyed as candidates.
The Trump administration, meanwhile, has thrown its weight behind a male candidate: Rafael Grossi, the Argentine head of the U.N. nuclear watchdog. Argentina’s government officially nominated Grossi, who has suggested a renewed focus on the U.N.’s original mandate to prevent war. The Trump administration has criticized U.N. efforts to address gender and climate issues on the global stage.
Echoing some U.S. critiques, Bachelet and Grynspan have also called for the U.N. to become more efficient and return to its first principles. But a successful candidate will need backing from far beyond Washington.
The toll of organized crime in Latin America has become one of the region’s top election issues. It has also attracted major attention and military resources from the Trump administration.
That does not mean that the United States is automatically setting countries’ security policies, however. Last year, Mexico pushed back against the White House’s proposed approach to drug trafficking, which included potential U.S. strikes on Mexican soil, the Washington Post reported. Instead, Mexico took its own steps to curb cartel action, reducing homicides and persuading the United States to back down.
In 2026, other countries in the region will take their own new steps on security policy. Chile’s Kast, who will be inaugurated in March, has pledged to step up the military’s role in anti-crime patrols and lengthen incarcerations. Crime is expected to be a leading issue in elections in Colombia and Peru.
Some Latin American leaders may continue to endorse purported U.S. anti-cartel actions in the region—most notably related to Venezuela—to stay on the Trump administration’s good side. But there are risks to this approach. If the White House escalates its pressure campaign against Venezuela, it may become harder to defend to Latin American publics.
