In the fifth wave of our study, we update our estimate of the number of Ukrainian refugees abroad, analyse the departure of young people aged 18–22, and examine the factors that shape their willingness to return to Ukraine.
We also analyse the employment and income levels of Ukrainian refugees, as well as their preparedness for a possible withdrawal of temporary protection in their host countries.
The study draws on data from a nationally representative sociological survey conducted in December 2025–January 2026 by the research agency Info Sapiens, commissioned by CES.
Below you will find a short digest with the most important and interesting findings from our study. Have further questions? You may find the answers in the study presentation and the full report — they contain much more detail.
We conducted this research with support of the International Rennaissance Foundation.
In 2026, 5.6 million Ukrainian refugees remain abroad
According to estimates by the Centre for Economic Strategy, as of January 2026, 5.6 million Ukrainian refugees remain abroad.
Of these, 4 million left Ukraine through the western borders. From the start of the full-scale war until the end of 2025, Ukraine’s border was crossed 60.4 million times for exit and 56.3 million times for entry; the difference between these figures reflects the number of people who left and did not return. This does not include Ukrainians who were forced to travel to European countries via Russia or Belarus.
We estimate that around 277 thousand Ukrainians (0.3 million) left for Europe through the territory of the Russian Federation or Belarus.
Another 1.3 million Ukrainians, according to the UN, became refugees in Russia or Belarus.
In 2025, 303 thousand more Ukrainian citizens left the country through the western and south-western borders than entered. This is 34% less than in 2024 (when 459 thousand more Ukrainian citizens left than returned home).
Young people are leaving, older people are returning to Ukraine
Most Ukrainian refugees abroad are adult women. They account for 40% of refugees.
The share of adult men among refugees increased slightly over the year, from 27% to 29%.
Children under 18 make up 31% of refugees.
A notable change over the year is the decline in the share of refugees aged over 45. This aligns with the broader trend of older Ukrainians being more inclined to return and may indicate a partial return of people in this age group.
Two thirds — 66% — of Ukrainian refugees are of working age (18–65). Young people — those under 35 — account for more than half of all Ukrainian refugees (56%).
More than half of refugees come from the east and south
Before leaving Ukraine, most refugees lived in Kyiv and Kyiv region (24%), as well as in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine (52%).
People left cities more often than villages. Only one in ten Ukrainian refugees came from a rural area. 64% of refugees had lived in large cities and regional centres: 20% in Kyiv, 11% in Kharkiv, 7% in Dnipro, and 6% in Odesa.
One in four Ukrainian refugees lives in Germany
The largest numbers of Ukrainian refugees currently live in Germany (23%) and Poland (19.5%).
Germany is chosen slightly more often by young people under 35. It hosts 28% of refugees under 35 and 20% of those aged 35 and over.
Poland is more attractive for refugees aged 35–49: 24% of this age group live there. By comparison, only 15% of refugees under 35 and 18% of those aged over 49 live in Poland.
Ukrainian refugees are not a homogeneous group
Ukrainians who left due to the full-scale invasion do not form a homogeneous group. They differ in their motivations, life and socio-economic circumstances, and plans for return.
A detailed description of the cluster analysis we conducted is available in the full version of the study. The key question for us is: “Will refugees return home?”
The cluster analysis identified two groups more inclined to return — which we call “Classic war-related” and “With a strong connection”. Two other groups are more likely to remain abroad — the “New life trajectory” and “Economically vulnerable” clusters.
The group most inclined to return is the “Classic war-related”. This group more often left due to hostilities in their settlement (26%) or nearby (27%), and less often due to economic reasons, job loss, fear of mobilisation, or disillusionment with Ukraine.
“Classic war-related” refugees have the highest positive balance of return intentions — 63% of this group say they definitely or probably plan to return. The average across all refugees is 43%.
Return intentions stabilised in 2025
Around 43% of refugees intend to return to Ukraine, while 36% do not or are unlikely to do so.
In this wave of the study, the share of refugees intending to return did not change compared with the previous wave. Before that, we observed a clear downward trend in return intentions.
Among those willing to return to Ukraine, almost 80% are ready to do so only after the final end of the war, marked by a signed agreement that would allow the resumption of civilian flights over Ukraine.
1.3–2.2 million refugees may return home
According to our calculations, under the baseline scenario, 1.6 million refugees will return to Ukraine after the war ends. Under this scenario, 2.7 million will remain abroad (excluding Russia and Belarus).
Under a pessimistic scenario, only 1.3 million Ukrainians will return, and 3.0 million will remain abroad. The optimistic scenario assumes that 2.2 million Ukrainians will return, leaving only 2.1 million refugees abroad.
Our scenarios are based on assumptions about how sincere respondents are in expressing their intention to return. For example, under the optimistic scenario, those who “definitely plan” to return will do so with a 100% probability. Under the baseline scenario, this probability falls to 80%, and under the pessimistic scenario to 60%.
In 2027, most refugees will try to settle abroad
Temporary protection for Ukrainians in the EU is in force until 4 March 2027.
After that date, Ukrainians’ automatic right to stay in EU countries will end. The EU plans a managed transition either to alternative legal statuses (based on education, employment, etc.) or to voluntary return to Ukraine.
In response to a question about preparedness for the withdrawal of temporary protection status, 21% of Ukrainian refugees said they already have other documents allowing them to stay in the country. Another 26% plan to obtain such alternative documents in the near future.
If temporary protection is withdrawn, 27% of refugees plan to seek residence permits in another country (not Ukraine). Only 23% plan to return to Ukraine. Another 11% would return temporarily but then seek ways to leave again. 11% would remain in their current country without proper authorisation.
Regression analysis of factors associated with the desire to return
Here we analyse which factors are associated with Ukrainians’ desire to return, based on the survey.
These results should not be interpreted as causal relationships. For example, if the regression shows that refugees in Poland are 65% more likely to return than refugees in Germany, this does not necessarily mean that moving from Germany to Poland would increase a person’s desire to return to Ukraine. Other unobserved factors may influence both country of residence and return intentions (omitted variable bias), or return plans may determine the choice of host country (reverse causality).
Nevertheless, the regression results help us better understand which refugees are more or less inclined to return and which factors are likely associated with these intentions.
As in previous waves of the survey, we use an ordered logit model (ordered logit regression). The dependent variable is stated plans to return. Independent variables include gender, age, presence of children, education, region of origin, host country, employment status, income, and so on. This analysis allows us to better understand which factors are associated with stronger or weaker intentions to return to Ukraine.
