We’re sharing key insights from Financial Times journalist Martin Sandbu, voiced during our recent discussion on frozen Russian assets.
I. Ukraine must know how much Russian money is frozen — and where it is held
«We’ve heard various estimates of the total amount, but in truth, we still don’t know all the details. The Euroclear figures are public and transparent — that’s good. The rest are much less certain. I agree that the numbers coming from Luxembourg look questionable.
The Russian Central Bank used to publish this data, and back then experts had no reason to doubt its professionalism. At the end of 2021, it reported holding about $350 billion in countries that are now part of the sanctions coalition — roughly €300 billion. So the total is likely higher than what we can currently account for. In other words, some of the money hasn’t yet been found.
The European Commission is now trying to broaden the scope — not only Euroclear assets and not only within the EU. If that at least improves data accuracy, that’s welcome. But I would urge that all figures be made public. There’s no argument against transparency, and publication would only make the discussion easier.»
II. How the markets react
«Excellent analysis from Iana Okhrimenko, Senior Economist at CES, shows that market reactions to confiscation or transfer of Russian assets would likely be limited. However, some governments fear not a general market response, but a targeted speculative attack on a particular European country.
For instance, Saudi Arabia might tell France: «We’ll sell your bonds if you proceed with this.»
Such signals have already occurred. It’s a separate challenge — but one that can be addressed. Ukrainian diplomats, together with civil society, should be ready to offer clear, well-argued responses.»
III. Political implications of the reparation loan
«This mechanism does not force Russia to pay. The European Commission’s documents clearly state that the initiative does not infringe on Russia’s legal rights. It’s important to understand this precisely — so as not to reinforce the misleading narrative that Russia is being made to pay. It’s a helpful step, but not a punitive one.
What does it actually do?
The EU lends money to Ukraine, backed by the future income generated from Russian assets. No Russian funds are being seized. Essentially, the EU obliges Euroclear to lend to the Union — and the Union, in turn, lends to Ukraine. The EU could have done the same without Euroclear’s involvement, simply by borrowing on the market.The connection to Russian assets was created largely for political optics — to make it appear that «Russia is being made to pay» and to ease concerns among European taxpayers. Unfortunately, that reflects weakness — even if the result is additional support for Ukraine.»
A full recording of the event, key quotes from all speakers, and the latest presentation on Ukraine’s monthly economic changes are available on our website.
This event has been funded by UK International Development from the UK government; however, the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK government’s official policies.
