Even people who are otherwise enthusiastic about a free market in labor can get cold feet about immigration once redistribution enters the picture. Some are fond of quoting Milton Friedman, who famously (or infamously) said:
“It’s just obvious you can’t have free immigration and a welfare state.”
On this view, immigration is fine under fully free market institutions, but in the actual world with its abundant government-provided benefits, immigration restrictions are justified to protect taxpayers from the added expense that could arise if immigrants consume these benefits. But this conclusion is too quick, and even Friedman’s position is more nuanced than people on both sides of the immigration debate tend to realize.
An initial point, though: the concern about the fiscal cost of immigration is overstated. For one reason, in the United States, most welfare spending goes to the very young or the very old. Immigrants, by contrast, are disproportionately of working age.
Setting that point aside, Friedman’s own view wasn’t that immigration as such is harmful. He argued that legal immigration is the problem, precisely because it allows immigrants to access government benefits. By contrast, he thought illegal immigration was beneficial. As he put it: “It’s a good thing for the illegal immigrants. It’s a good thing for the United States. It’s a good thing for the citizens of the country. But it’s only good so long as it’s illegal.” Friedman’s reasoning was that illegal immigration enables mutually beneficial market exchange while limiting immigrants’ access to government benefits.
Now, many fiscal conservatives balk at Friedman’s recommendation—namely, if the overconsumption of government resources is the problem with lawful immigration, the solution is to encourage people to break the law. I understand this reaction, but I admit I don’t share it. In my view, whether it’s okay for someone to do something doesn’t depend on whether lawmakers give them written permission. For instance, did you know that it’s against the law to drive on Cape Cod’s National Seashore’s beach if there’s not a tire-pressure gauge in your car? Nevertheless, I have no moral objection if you drive on the beach gaugelessly. Regardless of whether government officials approve, this is just a peaceful activity that doesn’t violate anyone’s rights.
Maybe you disagree with me. Still, as others have suggestedthere’s another way to accommodate Friedman’s general idea: admit immigrants as lawful permanent residents but restrict their access to certain government resources. Economists sometimes call this a “keyhole solution”—if the problem is immigrants’ consumption of benefits, then design a policy that narrowly targets that problem rather than restricts their freedom to immigrate entirely.
The main objection to this sort of policy seems to be moral rather than economic. Indeed, Friedman himself was asked about it and he replied that he found the proposal unappealing partly because it’s not “desirable to have two classes of citizens in a society.” That’s a good point. It’s unfair for a government to give some citizens taxpayer-financed benefits but not others. If two people live, work, and pay taxes within a country, government officials should treat them equally, which involves giving them both equal access to government resources.
Notice, though, that a policy of immigration restriction also treats citizens and prospective immigrants differently—it gives citizens, but not immigrants, access to domestic labor markets, private associations, educational opportunities, and more. Consequently, a principle of equal treatment actually seems to imply open borders. Given that Friedman rejects this option, the task becomes that of identifying the second-best solution. (Also, it’s not clear that Friedman can square his objection to keyhole solutions with his endorsement of illegal immigration, which would presumably also create two classes in a society.)
Why think that a policy of open immigration with restricted access to benefits is better than outright exclusion? The reason, in brief, is that admission with conditions treats prospective immigrants betterthan exclusion. A policy of open immigration with restricted benefits at least gives people the option to move, and it’s hard to see how giving someone a new option could make them worse off.
Here’s an analogy. Suppose John is entering the job market. One employer offers him a job with health insurance and a retirement plan. The next day, he receives another offer—this one comes with no benefits, but a much higher salary. Even if you think he should take the first job, it seems perfectly permissible to offer him the second. John is no worse off for having another option. If he doesn’t want to take it, he can simply decline it. And if he does prefer higher pay without benefits, he’s clearly better off for having the option.
John’s case is analogous to the case of a prospective immigrant who expects to earn significantly more by moving to a country where her access to government benefits is limited. If she prefers having access to a wider range of government-provided benefits in her current country to having higher earnings but fewer benefits in a new country, she can decline to move; in this case, she is no worse off for having the option. But if she prefers higher earnings with fewer benefits, the option makes her better off. Just as it’s permissible—indeed, probably good—to offer John the extra option, so too is it permissible to offer prospective immigrants the extra option.
It’s also worth highlighting another important aspect of restricting immigrants’ access to benefits rather than restricting their movement entirely. Admitting immigrants as lawful permanent residents removes the threat of deportation, among other consequences, that accompanies undocumented entry into a country. Even if you agree with Friedman (as I do) that the keyhole solution of admitting immigrants with reduced access to benefits isn’t totally fair, it’s still more fair than denying prospective immigrants the option of safely moving at all.
