Welcome to Foreign Policy’s South Asia Brief.
The highlights this week: Bangladesh holds its first election since the ouster of longtime Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, Islamabad grapples with the aftermath of its deadliest terrorist attack since 2008, and uncertainties persist in the U.S.-India trade deal.
Islamists on the Rise?
On Thursday, Bangladeshis will vote in one of their most consequential elections in years and the first since the 2024 uprising that ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, who ruled with an iron fist for 15 years. Hasina oversaw elections in 2014, 2018, and 2024 that were widely criticized by independent election observers as not free or fair.
Despite concerns about election-related violence, the campaign period was relatively peaceful, and the public mood in Bangladesh appears positive. In an International Republican Institute survey conducted last September and October, 66 percent of respondents said they were very likely to vote, and 80 percent said they were optimistic that the elections would be free and fair.
Still, the election unfolds amid some controversy. The interim government banned Hasina’s Awami League from participating in political activities. That means one of the country’s largest parties will be excluded from the vote. The Awami League’s absence is a large part of why the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is the heavy favorite.
The BNP is the country’s other major dynastic party, which maintains a large base and vast financial resources despite being suppressed by the Awami League for years. The recent return of Tarique Rahman, the BNP’s chair and presumptive candidate for prime minister, from exile in London has energized the party. Rahman’s mother, former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, died on Dec. 30, 2025.
There is another possibility that would mark a massive change in Bangladesh’s electoral politics: a triumph for Jamaat-e-Islami, the conservative Islamist party that has historically failed to gain a critical mass of votes and is known more for serving as a junior partner in electoral alliances.
Jamaat-e-Islami is controversial. It has ties to the Pakistani military forces that many scholars say committed genocide in 1971 while trying to suppress Bangladesh’s independence movement. The party also has past institutional linkages to terrorism: One of its former leaders, Maulana Saidur Rahman, later became a member of the militant group Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh.
But Jamaat-e-Islami’s political fortunes have surged since Hasina’s ouster. Soon after taking office in August 2024, the interim government removed a ban on the Islamist party. Last September, Jamaat-e-Islami’s student wing swept elections at Dhaka University—a contest long viewed as a national political barometer. The outcome was especially significant given the leading role of young people in the democratic uprising.
Jamaat-e-Islami projects itself as an anti-corruption party that is committed to delivering on public welfare—a powerful pitch, given the public’s anger over graft and concerns about economic stress. Significantly, the National Citizen Party—a new party comprising student leaders from the 2024 uprising—has joined an alliance led by the Islamist party.
In a recent essaylongtime Bangladesh watcher David Bergman offered other reasons that explain Jamaat-e-Islami’s appeal: the weakening of its 1971 “stigma” as time passes, rising anti-India sentiment, and its reputation as a party that rejects old political traditions such as patronage.
Jamaat-e-Islami is also taking more moderate positions. It has backed away from advocating for Islamic law, and its leaders have apologized for its role in the 1971 atrocities. The party has even nominated non-Muslim candidates in local elections. But old habits die hard: Current party leader Shafiqur Rahman recently said a woman could never lead the party.
Ultimately, Jamaat-e-Islami’s electoral fate is linked to several critical debates in Bangladesh. These include the role of secularism in politics and the degree to which the ideas behind the 2024 uprising—such as youth activism, anti-corruption, and broader political change—continue to resonate with Bangladeshi society.
Read more: Salil Tripathi writes on how, ahead of this election, most of Bangladesh’s political parties failed to deliver on a modest commitment to put more women on the ballot.
What We’re Following
Islamabad mosque attack. Last Friday, a suicide bomber targeted a Shiite mosque in Islamabad, killing at least 31 people and wounding around 170. A local faction of the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack, the deadliest in the Pakistani capital since a truck bomber killed more than 50 people at the Islamabad Marriott Hotel in 2008.
The bombing, much like an attack last November at a courthouse in Islamabad, is an unusual occurrence in the capital, which has been largely spared from a surge in terrorist attacks in recent years. Most have occurred in the country’s north and west, near the border with Afghanistan. Last Friday’s attack brought back memories of deadlier periods in Pakistan’s recent history.
The tragedy was also a reminder of the complex challenge that Pakistan faces when it comes to terrorism. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has staged most of the recent attacks, but Pakistan also faces a potent threat from the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), which carried out coordinated attacks in Balochistan province on Jan. 31.
The Islamic State has been less active in Pakistan than the TTP or the BLA, but it has nonetheless staged large attacks, including one at a public rally in Balochistan last year. The offshoot that claimed Friday’s attack, the Islamic State-Pakistan Province, is little known compared with South Asia’s main affiliate, the Islamic State-Khorasan Province—making the horrific attack even more unsettling.
Bangladesh, U.S. ink trade deal. On Monday, Bangladesh and the United States announced a trade deal that reduces U.S. tariffs to 19 percent—a somewhat symbolic decrease, as the levy was previously 20 percent, down from 37 percent when U.S. President Donald Trump first announced his steep tariffs last year.
Still, it’s a notable achievement for Bangladesh’s interim government in its waning days. Under the accordcertain Bangladeshi apparel and textile exports using U.S.-produced cotton and fiber will receive zero tariffs. (Ready-made garments are Bangladesh’s top export.) The terms of the deal also give Bangladesh giving greater market access for a range of U.S. products, including agricultural goods, chemicals, and medical devices.
Bangladesh also promised to protect internationally recognized labor rights, which may be tied to ongoing efforts to bring the U.S. International Development Finance Corp. (DFC) to Bangladesh. The DFC has so far declined to invest in Bangladesh because of labor rights concerns. But the country could benefit from DFC capital, which is currently focused on areas including agriculture, energy, and health.
Uncertainties persist in U.S.-India trade deal. Confusion remains about key elements of the trade framework agreement that Trump announced with India last week. One is the issue of Russian oil imports. A joint statement indicates that India will halt all Russian oil purchases, but that seems unlikely; New Delhi would struggle to find replacement imports at an attractive price.
Trump’s claim that India will buy more than $500 billion in U.S. goods has also sparked skepticism among analysts; this pledge appeared in the joint statement, too. On Monday, the United States released a fact sheet on the deal, which notably uses somewhat softer language about the two issues in question. (It also takes a few shots at India, slamming it for its “history of imposing highly protectionist non-tariff barriers.”)
The fact sheet notes India’s “commitment” to stop importing Russian oil and states that India “intends” to purchase $500 billion in U.S. goods. For now, what is known is that U.S. tariffs on India will come down from 50 percent to 18 percent and India will end or decrease tariffs on all U.S. industrial goods and many agricultural products.
FP’s Most Read This Week
Under the Radar
This month, Sri Lanka became the latest in a growing list of countries to offer digital nomad visas, which allow remote workers to reside temporarily in a country while working remotely for foreign companies or clients. In Sri Lanka’s case, applicants must be 18 or older and earn at least $2,000 per month without dependents.
The visa can be renewed annually and costs $500—seemingly a bargain for an arrangement that gives one the option of working from the beach every day. Sri Lanka presumably hopes that foreigners will take advantage of this new opportunity and inject much-needed revenue into its economy—especially its tourism industry.
Sri Lanka is the second South Asian country to offer a digital nomad visa. India has onebut it can’t be renewed, and a number of nationalities (including, curiously, Sri Lankans) are excluded.
