“What’s Up With the Economy?” is a podcast by the Centre for Economic Strategy in cooperation with Hromadske Radio, supported by PrivatBank.
Every week, hosts Anhelina Zavadetska and Maksym Samoiliuk talk with experts, entrepreneurs, analysts, and government officials about what is happening with Ukraine’s economy.
While the podcast is held in Ukrainian, we decided to summarise each issue with the most important insights.
In the new episode, our guest was Volodymyr Kudrytskyi, former head of Ukrenergo and co-founder of the company Nedzhen. We discussed his high-profile dismissal and the State Bureau of Investigation case, the connection with the Mindichgate corruption scandal, why state-owned companies failed to build power generation facilities, and why the idea of new nuclear power units is economically unviable.
We have highlighted the most important points:
- What did the Mindichgate corruption scandal actually reveal?
Volodymyr Kudrytskyi notes that this scandal should not be viewed locally as corruption in a single company. Energoatom has become an example of how corruption revelations do not guarantee change: despite the schemes being made public, many managers were not dismissed, and most of those involved kept their positions.
«The scandal did not reveal corruption at Energoatom, but rather corruption among the authorities, using Energoatom as an example of one of the largest sources of funding. […] We saw how the decision-making system in the energy sector really worked […] And the problem is not even in direct losses, not in the $100 million mentioned in Mindich’s tapes. The problem is in the billions, and possibly tens of billions, of dollars lost: unproduced GDP, money not invested in the Ukrainian energy sector. These losses are the greatest.»
- Why have the state’s attempts to build a new generation of electricity failed?
In 2024, state-owned companies fulfilled only 15% of the plan to build 1 GW of distributed generation. This pace is not due to technical limitations, but rather to management approaches: instead of organized decisions, long approval procedures prevailed. Through these practices, state managers want to reduce any personal legal risks, but at the same time delay the launch of new energy systems.
«To this day, these five state-owned companies have built 150 MW. That means that in almost two years, they have only managed to achieve 15%. Why? Because they operate in a regulated environment […] You cannot buy gas pistons without a tender, which takes six months. But if you buy them in two weeks, even from the most efficient supplier, the State Bureau of Investigation will come in two days […] and arrest you. For no reason. That’s why everyone goes through very long and complicated procedures».
- How is the power system currently transforming?
The era when large nuclear and coal-fired power plants formed the basis of the energy sector is coming to an end. Nowadays, it is not just production that is important, but the ability to quickly balance the system. Therefore, Ukraine needs to build not nuclear power plants at huge costs, but maneuverable capacities that are cheaper and work together with renewable energy.
«The era of slow coal-fired power stations and basic nuclear generation is gradually coming to an end. We now have very cheap sources of renewable energy—wind and sun—but unfortunately, they are unstable and do not produce electricity when consumers need it. […] In other words, electricity is becoming less of a commodity and more of a service — a service that is available when you need it. And in order for this service to be provided, you need this maneuverability and flexibility. We are currently investing in it, and it is yielding the greatest financial effect.»
