Few governments greeted Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency with as much enthusiasm as that of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. And few faced greater disappointment.
Modi was one of the first world leaders to meet Trump after his inauguration, and India quickly launched trade talks in recognition that commerce was now a central axis of U.S. foreign policy.
Few governments greeted Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency with as much enthusiasm as that of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. And few faced greater disappointment.
Modi was one of the first world leaders to meet Trump after his inauguration, and India quickly launched trade talks in recognition that commerce was now a central axis of U.S. foreign policy.
Yet hopes for elevating the India-U.S. strategic partnership came crashing down by August, when Trump raised the tariff on Indian goods to 50 percent. Part of the problem was Modi’s misreading of Trump’s grand delusions about peacemaking, especially regarding India’s military clashes with Pakistan. Had Modi been more effusive about Trump’s role in saving the subcontinent from itself, things might have unfolded a little differently between New Delhi and Washington.
Modi’s advisors had a decent grasp of the coalition that propelled Trump back into the White House. Yet they were blindsided by the power and fervor of the MAGA movement, which turned on India and its diaspora with unexpected force. Since then, New Delhi has calibrated its approach, which now rests on three principles: avoid public arguments with Trump despite his repeated claims (that New Delhi thinks are false) of having ended India’s war with Pakistan; praise his peace efforts in Gaza and Ukraine; and keep the broader U.S. system engaged on trade, technology, and defense.
In 2026, New Delhi sees more political space opening in Washington as Trump’s domestic standing shows signs of erosion. India’s strategy now turns on three axes.
First, mobilizing traditional pro-India constituencies—the security establishment, the U.S. Congress, business groups, and diaspora networks that fell silent under the weight of Trump’s dominance in 2025. If they were reluctant to speak up before, then some of them might now help rebalance the relationship. New Delhi also knows that it must find a way to make inroads with at least parts of the MAGA coalition.
Second, India is determined to avoid another crisis with Pakistan that might invite Trump’s meddling. A fresh round of military conflict could place India at the receiving end of Trump’s wild impulses once again.
Third, and most consequential, New Delhi is accelerating its diversification strategy. The tariff shock pushed India to broaden export destinations, fast-track trade talks with Europe, and expand economic links with Russia and other emerging markets. In security policy, India is hedging more deliberately—maintaining the U.S. partnership while easing tensions with China, deepening ties with Russia, and strategically engaging with Europe.
Just like people, countries get used to pain. As Modi learns to manage Trump’s tariffs, he has discovered that standing firm against Washington’s bullying plays well at home and earns respect abroad. For India’s traditional skeptics of the United States, Trump’s second term is a reminder not to place too many strategic eggs in the U.S. basket. For the optimists, the turbulence of 2025 may yet give way to a better footing in 2026 as Trump descends from the year’s Olympian political heights. Underlying that optimism is India’s bet that more than 25 years of bipartisan U.S. investment in a strategic partnership with it is unlikely to be destroyed in a year or two by even the most unpredictable White House.
